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Drugs, tragedy, romance, success, misfortune, luck, pathos, bitterness, jealousy and
struggle are not words that we expect in a review of an academic book of interviews
with some of the great and good of neural network research. But this book is not just
concerned with the science and engineering of neural network research as seen in the
literature; it deals with the motivation from the childhood and early developments of each
of the 17 interviewees and with informal accounts of their scientific endeavours. This is an
attempt to get to an understanding of the science through an understanding of the scientists
themselves, their schooling, their interests, and their major influences. It is a wonderfully
charming book and well worth reading.
To maintain the historical sequence of events, the editors have placed the interviews in
the order of the birth dates of the interviewees. This works well in many cases but there
are some notable exceptions. For example, the Werbos interview is sandwiched between
Sejnowski and Hinton when he had actually carried out significant work much earlier.
Then there is Leon Cooper who, although fourth oldest, should really belong, historically,
at position 12 because he first had a Nobel winning career in Physics. The idea seems a bit
ageist when Cooper actually complains about having to give his birth date in the interview.
While the “order by age” gives a reasonable approximation to the historical lineage, a better
lineage could have been obtained by putting the authors in the order in which they entered
the field, or ordered according to first period (’40s to ’60s), middle period (’60s to ’79) and
second period (’79 to present ’99).
As an historical record, some of the early interviews provide first hand accounts of
the intellectual and emotional climate surrounding studies of artificial neural networks,
cybernetics and artificial intelligence at the birth of computing. Rather than the usual
cleaned up view of science, this book looks at discovery in the raw. Names like Weiner,
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McCulloch, Pitts, Carnap, and Russell are intertwined and we see how their paths crossed
in the difficult period during and following the second world war. Jerry Lettvin, Jack Cowan
and Michael Arbib all give accounts of their association with the famous McCulloch
(and Pitts) group at MIT. All three give differing accounts of how McCulloch and Pitts
met. However, the Arbib and Cowan accounts came from McCulloch whereas the Lettvin
account is first hand.
Lettvin’s interview, the first in the book, is particularly gripping. It sets the scene of
wartime USA in the hospital and psychiatric community and tells how the development of
ideas still progressed through adversity (there is no mention of funding bodies or research
grants here). Achievement arose through the power of intellectual passion to develop a
theory about how the brain gives rise to mind (and to intelligence). In this respect, the
achievement award must go to McCulloch and Pitts who inspired a whole generation of
brilliant young researchers, some of whom are interviewed here. The McCulloch and Pitts
relationship and the genius of Pitts is also described in the interviews of Jack Cowan and
Michael Arbib.
It was McCulloch and Pitts, in the early 1940s, who began to build the computational
foundations for neural network research. Pitts was an enthusiast of the work of Leibniz
who had invented the binary number system in the late 17th century. Leibniz had also
pointed out that, if a binary calculator was possible (he couldn’t actually build one at
the time), then so was a logical machine that could perform any finite task that could
be expressed completely and unambiguously in logical language. This fitted well with the
goals of McCulloch and Pitts. From real neural research, they seized on the idea of the
all-or-none, or threshold, property of neurons—if the input is strong enough the neuron
fires, otherwise it stays at base level. Thus the neuron can, abstractly, be considered as
binary computing element with an output of 1 (firing) or 0 (resting). Logical (Boolean)
machines could be constructed by joining together these simple binary neurons with the
goal of showing one way in which a logical language of thought could arise from a nervous
system.
McCulloch is painted as a wild extroverted Scot who liked to drink a lot—it made him
very ill in the end. As described in other interviews, he was a frightening man but with
a very generous spirit and good heart. He welcomed the homeless Lettvin and Pitts into
his own family home with his wife (as he did for later students) during the early 1940s.
This is when they wrote their seminal paper, The Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in
Nervous Activity [Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 5 (1943) 115–133]. Interestingly,
Cowan tells us that McCulloch had been working on these problems for about 20 years but
the solutions came within a couple of months after his collaboration with the 17 year old
Pitts.
Pitts is portrayed as a brilliant but tragic character who came to an early and sad end.
Apparently at age 12 he had read Principia Mathematica when he ran into a library to hide
from bullies. Afterwards, when he escaped, he wrote to Russell pointing out some serious
problems and Russell invited him to come to England as a student. Instead, he went to
Chicago where the famous logician Carnap was on the faculty. As an unregistered student,
Pitts wrote a critique of Carnap’s new book on Logic. The story goes that the penniless
Pitts marched into Carnap’s office one day and presented him with some of the failings
and problems of the book. He then left without giving his name. Carnap searched hard for
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several months before he found Pitts and he got the university to give him a menial job.
This is a little like the recent movie Good Will Hunting except that in that case the young
working class genius janitor gets a lot of money for accepting promotion from janitor to
researcher. In the real world, Pitts gets promoted to assistant janitor!
A number of interviewees mention Pitts’ tragic demise. Arbib tells the tale of meeting
Pitts in about 1959 to talk to him about some of the more obscure proofs in the 1943
McCulloch and Pitts article ibid. He couldn’t get much sense out of Pitts because he was
shaking so much with the DTs. Lettvin attributes Pitts’ disillusionment partly to the results
from a series of experiments by their group that culminated in the paper “What the frog’s
eye tells the frog’s brain”. They had found perceptual invariances that were not formally
tractable in a logical way. Although Pitts believed in and approved of the results, it showed
him that logic was not the right approach to the brain.
During the late 1950s there was interest in how to adapt neural networks automatically;
to develop learning rules. This did not grow from the McCulloch group, according to
Jack Cowan, because McCulloch believed that “You have to get to know the anatomy [of
neural networks] before you can pervert it”. His philosophy was that if something is true,
it works—rather than if something works it is true. McCulloch believed in innate structure.
His group were strong believers in the Kantian notions of synthetic a priori and so had
little time for learning theories.
The third chapter is an interview with Bernard Widrow, one of the pioneers of neural
network learning theory. There is a feeling of real scientific development and perseverance
in Widrow’s interview. He has talked about some of these things before at meetings but
it is useful to have a written archival record. Widrow and Hoff developed a least mean
squares learning algorithm in 1959 and successfully tested it on a computer. Because of
the limitations of computing facilities at the time, Widrow (with Hoff) developed a simple
method of copper plating pencil leads to produce variable resistors—reversing the current
removed plating. In this way, they could have adaptive weights in hardware. This was the
first adaptive filter built in hardware. Rosenblatt, for his famous Perceptron model of the
same period, used motorised ‘pots’ to adjust the weights.
There is a myth that the first wave of neural network research, particularly on learning
machines, came to an abrupt end because of a seminal critique by Minsky and Papert
in their book, Perceptrons [MIT Press, 1969]. Apparently Minsky had attended an early
lecture by Rosenblatt on perceptron learning where the audience were not convinced that
it could do what Rosenblatt said it could do (there was no perceptron convergence proof
then). Cowan was there and says that he thinks it was this encounter that set Minsky against
perceptrons. The book contains a number of proofs that exposed some of the limitations
of learning methods with single layer neural nets. It was clear to Minsky and Papert
that a multilayer net (with hidden units) could overcome many of the problems that they
presented for perceptrons; however, they claimed that the problem of programming hidden
units was not solveable.
It is often said that it was this book that drove interest and funding out of the field.
However, a number of those interviewed were around at the time and see it quite differently.
Widrow holds that by the time Perceptrons was published, nobody was doing that kind of
research anymore. Arbib says that the fashion in computer science departments had already
shifted the emphasis to the symbolic methods of AI before the book came out. He cannot
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see why it would be taken seriously as a critique by neural network researchers since, “It is
like saying to computer hackers that if you can’t have any loops in your code, and you only
have ten instructions, then serial computers are really very limited”. Nonetheless, Cowan
tells the story of how reports by Minsky and Papert began to circulate in the early 1960s
and these put younger researchers off the idea of coming into the field.
However it happened, there was a dramatic downturn of interest in neural networks in the
mid to late 1960s. During this middle period, up to 1979, a number of dedicated researchers
kept the torch burning. It was a difficult time in an unpopular field and the struggle clearly
shows in some of the interviews. There is a problem that when the resurgence in neural
networks came, much of the earlier work was overlooked and some of the problems were
solved again in a similar way but “independently”. This seemed to have caused discontent
among some of those who had worked through the difficult years. There are a number of
discussions of “the wheel being reinvented” or even of “unconcious” plagiarism. A few
of those interviewed (including Teuovo Kohonen) argue, without malice, that the Hopfield
net had been discovered more than once before Hopfield discovered it in the early 1980s.
Steven Grossberg charts an early academic life full of pitfalls and of not being credited
properly for what he has contributed to neural network research. Everyone in the field
knows who Grossberg is and he is considerably more respected that he seems to realise.
He has a very strong reputation for individual achievement, but people generally don’t use
his methods. This may be because he never had the critical mass that the newcomers had
(or the packaging). In his chapter there are many accusations of other people’s learning
methods being a pale reflection of his own. He seems bitter about setting precedents—
that is where he thinks that there is a lack of scholarship. His work has been published
in prominent and respectable archival journals, so why have people gone for re-invention
rather than reading the original sources? One day someone will have the energy to do
a proper history of the development of neural network learning methods—an incredibly
complex job—and then the truth will be revealed. Most researchers don’t seem to care.
Grossberg has a second interview in the book with his wife, Gail Carpenter. It is a shame
that the only female representative in the book, a very prominent and active researcher,
only got a shared chapter with her husband to discuss how their close working relationship
operates. Nonetheless, it is a very charming interview that shows quite a different more
upbeat and romantic side to Stephen and how a couple can manage to work so closely
together (something this reviewer knows quite a lot about).
Werbos, who also worked through the middle period, has a sad tale to tell, but he tells it
cheerfully. He was clearly a prodigy who did everything a little too early. He graduated
from university at age 14 or 15 (1961 or 1962) and immediately began to work on a
multivariate learning rule to replace Hebbian learning which had not been implemented at
that time. In some ways Werbos was cheated out of his place in science. The interview tells
of his struggles with Harvard graduate school and how he was eventually forced (starving
and homeless) to write a thesis on a political forecasting problem.
He had the idea of backpropagation learning a long time before the second coming of
neural network research. This was the solution to how to program or assign credit to the
hidden units of a multilayer neural network. As mentioned earlier, such networks were
recognised by Minsky and Papert as a way of defeating many of their criticisms and they
claimed that the learning was unsolvable. This was a major achievement for the young
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Werbos, but his thesis committee at Harvard thought at the time that, although do-able, it
was too trivial for a Ph.D. thesis. Werbos does not seem bitter and it is often difficult to
show that you are the earliest antecedent. Cowan points to even earlier roots for backpropa-
gation (including the term) in Frank Rosenblatt’s 1962 book, Principles of Neurodynamics
[Spartan books]. As Cowan puts it, “The only thing that’s not there is the actual algorithm,
the details of it, but the structure and everything else is there. Poor old Frank was vastly
undervalued in his day”. But the “actual” algorithm was the most tricky bit.
OK, so nowadays Werbos gets credited as having invented backpropagation indepen-
dently and much earlier than Rumelhart. But if he had invented it 10 years later when there
was a critical mass of people hoping for a multilayer learning rule, he would have had a
very different career. He also worked on very early versions of time delay neural networks
and reinforcement learning but no one paid attention at the time and few still do.
The interviews of some of the main movers of the 1980s revival, Rumelhart,
Sejnowski, and Hinton provide a lot of insightful, though informal, information about their
scientific developments through the 1980s. Rumelhart charts his route from Mathematical
Psychology through AI and Cognitive Science to neural networks and the famous 1979
Sloan Foundation Meeting that began the modern era in neural networks. There are
interesting insights into Rumelhart’s development of backpropagation and how Hinton
was won over because of learning difficulties with the Boltzmann machine (“Boltzmann
machines were painful”).
Hinton starts off with some amusing anecdotes about his childhood; his brush (and
brush-off) with religion at school and his Stalinist father, the entomologist. It is interesting
to hear about his background and his trouble with the disciplines at Cambridge and
even the 1979 Sloan Conference. However, the interview stands out for his discussion
of the development of the field through the 1980s. He talks about the development of the
Boltzmann machine and the struggle, with Sejnowski, to develop a learning method for it.
Hinton explains in some detail why he moved over to backpropagation learning and why
he then moved onto the Helmholtz machine—there is a very good informal description of
the latter. Sejnowski gives an account of his early dealing with backpropagation and his
excitement at the development of the NETtalk system (a text to phoneme mapping net).
A worthwhile aspect of the book is that it gets behind the scenes and shows how the
development of ideas in neural networks, like many in AI, are not derived from neat
formalisms and proofs that are simply followed through. The world of scientific reasoning
is seen as much messier. There was creative mathematical thinking but much of it was
piecemeal and developed over time as more testing was carried out. The David Rumelhart,
Geoffrey Hinton and Terry Sejnowski interviews are very good in this respect. They talk
of inspirations, lucky connections, and hard work. It is particularly interesting to hear their
informal discussion of the processes they went through in the development of their theories.
Back to the future
It would be difficult to say now that neural network research is still in its infancy,
regardless of which period we choose to start the clock. We could start in the mid eighteen
hundreds with Ramon Y. Cajal’s discovery of the synapse, the weighted connection
between neurons or later, during the “doctrine of the neurone”, or with introduction in the
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late 1890s, by the psychologist and philosopher William James, of what we now call the
Hebbian learning rule. This period is hardly mentioned in the book. We could start with the
foundational work of McCulloch and Pitts who were the first to produce the computational
ideas. But even if we set the birth date to the most recent flourishing as the date of the
Sloan Meeting in 1979, we have to say that neural networks have come of age. So what of
the future?
One disappointing aspect of the book is the way it answers the question of the future
of the field of neural nets, neural computing, connectionism, PDP, or whatever you wish
to call it. There is some talk from the interviewees about their own areas of interest, some
talk about an increase in all things hardware and how speed-up will help, some are evasive
and some talk of large scale assimilation of the “tools” into many disciplines. Hinton,
for example, talks about an increasingly fruitful relationship between neural networks and
belief nets in AI. Arbib talks about more work on the construction of neural net/symbolic
hybrids. Nowhere is there any talk about great new hopes for developments in “pure” neural
networks research.
This does not mean that there is a decline in neural computing. It has pushed its way
into an important role in many disciplines such as engineering, computing, philosophy,
anthropology, AI, cognitive science, economics, robotics, biology. Difficult applications
abound in a large number of areas and we have a fairly good idea of what we can do,
computationally, with neural networks.
There is also considerable computational modelling of brain and neural processes still
going on in the neurobiology community and there is much to be done here. Hinton says,
“Something I am rather disappointed about is that we still haven’t got a clue about what
learning algorithm the brain uses. . . ”. Thus we have not realised the hopes of the founders,
nor solved the original problems. Perhaps this is where the exciting future of neural
computing lies; a continuation of the unsolved problems that began the whole intellectual
endeavour. Perhaps there will be a new resurgence when “real” animal and neural learning
is more fully understood. On the other hand, science may require a very different kind of
theory than twentieth century neural network research can supply.
There has been dissatisfaction among many of the neurobiologists about how the
artificial neural network community has become more concerned with statistical methods
and engineering applications than with the biological constraints. Hinton rightly points out
that there is currently a strong and fruitful relationship between statisticians and neural
network workers. This is good in many ways. If we want neural network technology to go
into industry, then the tools need to be proved and verified and we need to understand the
reliability and safety issues. Moreover, in science, we ultimately need a full understanding
and formal model for proper prediciton and control. However, there are dangers with
proceeding too far down this formal route and some of these are beginning to show.
We have not yet got a real purchase on the biological and psychological goals of the
founders of the field and formalising too much too quickly can lead to an ossification that
frowns upon more adventurous work in the field. Much of the current research in neural
networks is about “tweaking” to get improved speed or efficiency of some algorithm or
other. It is as if the founders set out to develop TV and video and we ended up with a
crystal radio—then all of the technicians moved in and spent their time telling us how to
fine tune it to get better reception. If we have the audacity to discuss the TV set again we
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are told that this is an abuse of the tuning method and not the proper way to do things. One
frequently hears some statistician or other giving talks about the “proper methods” or the
“abuse” of the methods.
As an another analogy, imagine working on a solution to the Rubik cube and stopping
at a position that appears to be two thirds of the solution, i.e., all the colours are in the
correct places for two layers and so there is just the third layer to go. Now you could at
this point bring in the heavy formal methods and statistics to find better and faster methods
to get to this two-thirds solution. If you remember the Rubik cube, you will realise that
the two-thirds solution has to be undone again in order to reach the full solution. After
all the hard work of developing solid and well founded methods for getting to the two-
thirds solution it will be a very great struggle to convince the statisticians that we have
to jettison it and move on (although, for some, it may be used as a landmark on the way
to a solution). These researchers, not wanting to throw away the outcomes of their hard
won battles, would think that those pushing for the break up were crazy or stupid or both.
However, despite the increasing ossification there is still some adventurous research going
on in areas such as Artificial Life, where novel neural network architectures and learning
rules are being discovered with evolutionary methods. Although some of this work may
seem very messy, it is still very important to let the less formal creative work flower. As we
have seen from the interviews, until we know the answers to the problems we don’t know
a priori which are going to be the best solutions.
There has also been bickering between neuroscientists and engineers about the casual
use of terms such as neuron and synaptic fibres. Perhaps this is inevitable since the names
are kind of sexy but the implications of the labels make little difference for engineering
a product; for the biologist, these same labels may have great causal significance.
Rumelhart says that the real interests of most biologists, psychologists, and engineers
are too divergent for them to be interested in the same issues. He goes on to discuss
how the commercial sector has no interest in the biological aspects—they want tools that
work—and biologists have no interest in the commercial world. Rumelhart does not see a
fundamental convergence of interest. I have often found an edginess when I have been at
meeting with biologists and engineers. At debriefing sessions one often hears, “but all she
is interested in is the techchnique” or “all this biology waffle is OK in its place but it not
going to help us engineer x”. Nonethess, the breaking down of interdisciplinary boundaries
is so intellectually rewarding that it is well worth the personal hassle and nonsense.
All of this assimilation to individual disciplines makes the pure field of (artificial) neural
networks somewhat rarefied. Rumelhart says that, “the generic neural network person or
the generic neural network conference is probably a short lived thing”, and “I believe that
there will be a field and which will be called the neural network field and which will be
the residual, really, the theory. Somebody will continue doing it, and it will get more and
more esoteric, as always happens”. Rumelhart may be right, but from a personal point of
view it was the very idea, in the early 1980s, that there might at last be an interdisciplinary
language, that most attracted me to the field. Many others feel the same way about breaking
down disciplinary boundaries, even without neural nets, and they can still be found at
robotics conferences and workshops as well as at AI and Cognitive Science gatherings.
